up:: 071a MOC Realismo Crítico

“This consists in the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being can always be analysed in terms of our knowledge of being, that it is sufficient for philosophy to ‘treat only of the network, and not what the network describes’, results in the systematic dissolution of the idea of a world (which I shall here metaphorically characterize as an ontological realm) independent of but investigated by science.” (BHASKAR, p. 36-7; grifo meu)

Me parece que a falácia epistêmica é uma inversão: invés de considerar como teorias (ideais) surgem com referência ao mundo que as motiva, analisa-se pressuposições sobre nosso conhecimento do mundo, como se houvesse uma linha direta, um-por-um, entre nosso conhecimento e o que há no mundo.


References

  • BHASKAR, Roy. A Realist Theory of Science. 2. ed. Nova Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978.